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Abstract. We propose some simple changes to a class of Quantum Key
Distribution protocols. The first enhancement ensures early detection of
any attempted Man-in-the-Middle attack and results in less leakage of
key material to any eavesdropping attacker. We argue that this version
is at least as secure as the original BB’84 scheme, but ensures a closer
binding of the key establishment and authentication components of the
protocol. Further proposed enhancements lead to a doubling of the key
rate, but the security arguments become more delicate.
We also touch on the need to enhance the models used to ana-
lyze both the classical and quantum aspects of QKD protocols. This
is prompted by the observation that existing analyses treat the quantum
(key-establishment) and classical (authentication etc) phases separately
and then combine them in a simple-minded fashion.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to present enhancements to existing
prepare-and-measure Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols, and to ar-
gue that we need to enrich our models for the analysis of QKD protocols, in
particular to deal with this enhancement, but also for QKD protocols in general.
QKD exploits features of quantum mechanics, in particular Heisenberg’s Un-
certainly Principle and the No-Cloning Theorem, to ensure that any attempt by
an eavesdropper to monitor the quantum channel will, with high probability be
detected. Typically, QKD strives to provide unconditional secrecy, i.e. secrecy
against an adversary with unbounded computational power. This contrasts with
most classical crypto, where the security properties are typically based on hard
computational problems and therefore assume an adversary with bounded com-
putational power.
In this paperwe focus on enhancing theBB’84 protocol due toBennett andBras-
sard, [BB84]. The ﬁrst enhancement proposed here is very simple but appears to
be rather eﬀective. After a quantum phase, protocols such as BB’84 involve a ﬁrst
classical step of agreeing forwhichphotons the receiver used the “correct”measure-
ment basis, followed by a step in which Anne and Bob agree a subset on which they
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will compare their bits to detect any eavesdropping/noise on the quantum chan-
nel. In existing schemes, the agreement on the correct set and the eavesdropping
detection subset is done by open negotiation, and so is known also to an attacker,
indeed could potentially be manipulated by the attacker. Some form of end-to-end
authentication and integrity property is required for the channel overwhich this ne-
gotiation takes place, and in practice this is provided by cryptographicmeans that
require Anne and Bob to pre-share a secret authentication key. In our enhance-
ment, Anne and Bob compute the subset for comparison separately and secretly,
as a function of entropy derived from the previously established, secret authenti-
cation string. This results in less leakage of information to any eavesdropper and
provides early, implicit authentication of the protocol.
The second enhancement is rather more audacious: we propose that the prepa-
ration/measurement bases, rather than being chosen purely randomly, are deter-
mined as pseudo-random functions of the prior, shared secret. Thus Anne and
Bob are able to independently compute the basis sequence. Thus Bob can use
the correct basis to measure all the photons emitted by Anne, rather than just
guessing as for the conventional BB’84. This results in a doubling of the resulting
bit rate, but now the security arguments become more delicate. A crucial obser-
vation that emerges from the analysis is that any measurements performed on a
single photon by an eavesdropper, Yves, leak no information about the prepara-
tion basis. Consequently Yves cannot determine the seed of the pseudorandom
function even with unlimited computational resources, as he cannot gain any
information about the output from it. This, rather surprising observation is key
to showing that this enhancement does not sacriﬁce security.
The third, even more radical, enhancement involves checking all the bits, not
just a subset, without revealing anything about them. In certain circumstances,
this makes the protocol more eﬃcient.
We discuss the need for suitable models for the analysis of such protocols. Ex-
isting analyses typically use a physics (quantum mechanics based) model to argue
that any eavesdropping on the quantum channel will be detectable during the clas-
sical phase, and any information leakage can be strictly bounded. The proofs are
essentially reductionproofs: violation of these propertieswould imply the existence
of a way to violate principles of quantum mechanics: Heisenberg Uncertainty and
the no-cloning theorem for example. It is usually then argued that Man-In-The-
Middle attacks canbe thwartedbyusingunconditional authenticationmechanisms
onappropriate steps of the classical exchanges.Authentication is typically achieved
using MACs based on universal hash functions such as the Carter-Wegman class.
Most descriptions of QKD protocols in the literature are rather vague or inconsis-
tent as to which of the classical exchanges should be authenticated.
Such a proof strategy is worrying: it treats the key-establishment and authen-
tication phases separately and then composes them in a rather simple-minded
fashion. We know from decades of experience analyzing classical protocols and
primitives that great care needs to be taken in composing modules and argu-
ments. We also know that it is essential that the key-establishment and authen-
tication be inextricably bound together.
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2 Background
BB’84, or variants of it, constitute the form of QKD that are most advanced
in terms of implementation and commercialization. Similar constructs to those
presented here apply to other QKD protocols, e.g. entanglement based proto-
cols such as Ekert’91, [Eke91], but we’ll stick to BB’84 based protocols for the
purposes of this paper.
First we brieﬂy outline the steps of conventional (prepare and measure) QKD
protocols. We describe the idealized ﬂow of the protocol, assuming a suﬃciently
low level of noise on the quantum channel and ignoring complications such as
maintaining synchronization of the photon indices, multiple photon pulses etc.
We then describe the changes to the eavesdropping detection and key sifting
steps that constitute the enhancements proposed here.
As is standard, we assume that Anne and Bob share a secret bit string s
prior to starting the protocol, and that this will be used to authenticate the key
establishment. Note that, in order to achieve unconditional guarantees, none of
the initial string should ever be re-used. If we use a stretch of the s string, say
to authenticate a message using a MAC style mechanism, then this stretch of s
must be discarded after use.
We assume that Anne possesses a device capable of emitting individual pho-
tons circularly polarized in one of four states: (↑) 0◦ (↗) 45◦ (→) 90◦ (↘) 135◦.
Bob possesses a polarization measurement device that can be set to measure
either in the horizontal (⊕) or diagonal (⊗) basis. We take the convention that
in the ⊕ basis, a 0◦ photon encodes a 1 and a 90◦ photon encodes a 0, and in
the ⊗ basis, 45◦ encodes a 1 and 135◦ a 0.
We will not go into the details of the “operational semantics” arising from
the quantum mechanics, except to remark that when the circular polarization
of a photon is measured with the “correct” basis the state will collapse to the
correct eigenstate with 100% probability. If the “wrong” basis is used, the wave
function will collapse into either of the eigenstates with 50% probability. Thus,
for example, if a ↑ photon is measured in the ⊕ basis it will collapse to the ↑
state. If a ↗ photon is measured in the ⊕ basis it will collapse to a ↑ state
with 50% probability and a → state with 50% probability, and similarly for the
other combinations. More generally, if the angle between the photon state and
an eigenstate is θ, then the probability that it will collapse to this eigenstate is
given by cos2(θ).
2.1 Phase 1 : The Quantum Channel
Anne emits a stream of photons over a suitable channel, e.g. optical ﬁber or free
space. Each photon will be polarized in one of the four possible polarizations
chosen randomly and independently. The source of this randomness is pure as
opposed to pseudo-random. Anne keeps a record of the chosen polarization of
each emitted photon. We will assume that mechanisms are in place to allow Anne
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and Bob to label each photon with a unique and consistent index, e.g. numbered
consecutively. We’ll refer to this indexing set as φ. Typically Anne emits a large
number of photons, perhaps tens of thousands. Bob, at the other end of the
quantum channel, measures each incoming photon in one of the two bases, chosen
independently at random (again, really random). Bob keeps a record of the bases
he used for each measurement and the outcome of the measurement (as a bit).
We now move to the classical phases of the protocol in which Anne and Bob
exchange classical information over conventional, classical channels. These chan-
nels are not assumed to be secret, but are where necessary provided with integrity
and endpoint authentication using information-theoretically secure MACs based
on the prior shared secret string s.
2.2 Phase 2 : Key Sifting
Once the transmission and measurement of the photons is ﬁnished, Anne and
Bob need to agree for which photons Bob used the “correct” measurement basis
(the ⊕ basis in the case of 0◦ and 90◦ polarization, and the ⊗ in the case
of 45◦ and 135◦ polarization). For these photons, in the absence of noise or
eavesdropping on the quantum channel, the bit corresponding to the outcome
of Bob’s measurement should match Anne’s bit. Where Bob used the “wrong”
basis, the outcome of the measurement will be a random choice of 0 or 1. This
agreement is established over open channels and so any attacker eavesdropping
the classical channel will also learn this information.
To this end, for example, Bob reveals his choice of measurement basis for
each photon (index). Anne responds by stating for which indices his choice was
correct, but without revealing the polarization (i.e. the corresponding bit). At
the end of this phase they have agreed the subset of the indices on which, aside
from noise, they should have agreement between their bits. We’ll refer to this
set as φ1. The complement set of φ1 in φ is discarded.
2.3 Phase 3 : Detection of Eavesdropping
Now Anne and Bob need to agree a subset of φ1 on which they will compare their
bits to establish whether any eavesdropping occurred on the quantum channel.
We will refer to this subset of φ1 as φ2. It is essential that φ2 is chosen at random
after the quantum phase is complete, but it is not, in the existing protocols,
assumed that it is kept secret, rather it is established by open discussion and
hence assumed known to the attacker.
Once they have agreed on φ2, Anne and Bob compare bits for each index in
φ2. In the absence of eavesdropping and noise, they should agree on all these
bits. In practice, due to noise on the quantum channel, there will be some level
of disagreement, but as long as this is low enough to be compatible with the
noisiness of the channel they conclude that there was either no eavesdropping or
any possible eavesdropping is bounded to a suﬃciently low level. If the level of
disagreement exceeds an appropriate threshold, typically around 11%, they will
conclude that a signiﬁcant level of eavesdropping is likely and abort the protocol
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run. Note that they cannot distinguish between noise and eavesdropping. In line
with the literature, we refer to this level of discrepancy as the Quantum Error
Rate (QER).
2.4 Phase 4: Information Reconciliation
Assuming that they have not aborted after phase 3, Anne and Bob proceed to
phase 4: where they start to construct the new session key. They now work with
the complement of φ2 in φ1, which we will call φ3. Thus φ3 is the set of indices of
photons for which Bob used the correct basis but for which they have revealed no
information about the corresponding bits. For the bits indexed by φ3, Anne and
Bob should each have a string of bits which, aside from noise and eavesdropping,
will match. The attacker should know at most a bounded amount about these
bits. The problem is that there will inevitably be some disagreement between
their bits strings due to the QER. They need to eliminate these mismatches
while revealing as little as possible to an attacker eavesdropping on the classical
channel about the actual bit strings. This is usually done using a “cascade”
protocol [BS93]. This is quite standard and will be used unchanged in our ﬁrst
two enhancements, so we will not go into the details here. However our third
enhancement will propose an alternative approach.
2.5 Phase 5: Secrecy Amplification
We assume that after completing phase 4 above, Anne and Bob share identical
bit strings. An attacker should have at most a bounded amount of informa-
tion about these strings, gleaned possibly from some “below the radar” level of
eavesdropping on the quantum channel and by monitoring the classical channel,
in particular from monitoring phase 4. Anne and Bob can use the QER they
observed in phase 3 to bound the information that Yves might extract. This
information now needs to be reduced to a negligible level by a process of “se-
crecy ampliﬁcation”. In essence the string is “distilled” down to a shorter string
with purer entropy from the attacker’s perspective. Again, the procedure here is
perfectly standard and will be unchanged in our enhanced protocol so we omit
details, [BBCM95].
2.6 Phase 6: Key Confirmation
Finally, to conﬁrm that Anne and Bob indeed share the same distilled key and
to authenticate the key, they can perform a ﬁnal key conﬁrmation step. They
can for example each compute a keyed universal hash over the key, keyed using
a fresh stretch of the initial shared string s, and exchange parts of the output.
These values reveal no information about the session key to an eavesdropper,
but if these values agree then Anne and Bob can be conﬁdent that they possess
the same session key, and that the key has been shared with the correct counter-
party.
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They now have a conﬁrmed secret key that can be used for secure communi-
cation in a One-Time-Pad (Vernam) encryption mode to provide unconditional
secrecy, or in conjunction with a universal hash function to provide unconditional
integrity. Alternatively, the key could be used for encryption under a suitable
block cipher such as AES, but in this case the security properties are no longer
unconditional.
Anne and Bob should set aside a suitable stretch of this freshly established
key to use for authentication in the next run of the protocol.
Note that in existing descriptions of the protocol, these classical exchanges
are over public channels and so the attacker knows the index sets φ1, φ2 and φ3
and indeed the bits of the string indexed by φ2. Descriptions vary as to which of
these exchanges are authenticated and how, but these details are not relevant for
our purpose here. The point for us is simply that at least some of the exchanges
must be authenticated, and that in practice this requires a pre-established shared
authentication secret.
3 The First Enhancement
The ﬁrst proposed enhancement to the above style of protocol is very simple
and modiﬁes only phase 3: rather than have Anne and Bob agree the subset
φ2 in a public fashion, we provide a way for each of them to compute it in a
secret fashion. Besides leaking less information, this approach also provides early,
implicit authentication. For this they will use an agreed stretch of the shared
initial shared secret string s, say the ﬁrst 128 bits, call this s′, to compute φ2.
The details of this construction can be varied as necessary, but it should have
the following properties:
– It must be a deterministic function of the secret string s′. Thus, given s′,
Anne and Bob should compute the same set of indices.
– It should be able to deal with an input of any given length (corresponding
to the size of index set for which they establish that Bob used the correct
measurement basis, i.e. the size of the φ1 set).
– It should be able to accept a value p (0 < p < 1) as a parameter and extract
a proportion p of the φ1 indices.
– An attacker, who knows p but does not know s′, should not have a strategy
for guessing φ2 that is signiﬁcantly better than guessing at random with
probability p, even if the attacker has been “lucky” in guessing a higher
than average proportion of the bits of s′.
An example of a simple way to realize such a construction is for Anne and
Bob to use the s′ value as a key for AES in Counter mode to generate a pseudo-
random string w. The reason for this is that block ciphers are designed to have
the property that that streams produced by even slightly diﬀerent keys will
be uncorrelated. Note that we are not using diﬃculty of inversion: Yves has
unlimited computational power but cannot, even indirectly, observe the cipher
stream.
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Suppose, for illustration, that Anne initially transmits 1024 photons to Bob.
For approximately 512 of these they will establish that Bob used the correct
measurement basis, i.e. the φ1 set. Suppose that they want to select 25% of these
to compare, i.e. approx 128 indices to form the φ2 set on which they will compare
bits to check their level of agreement. They each use s to produce a string w.
They segment w into pairs of bits, and for each 00 pair they select the index in
φ1. The 01, 10, and 11 pairs are not selected. This will yield approximately 128
bits. Anne can now transmit the ﬁrst 64 bits to Bob and Bob transmits the last
64 bits to Anne. They do not reveal publicly the positions to which these bit
values correspond.
More generally, suppose Anne and Bob want to select approximately 1/m of
the φ1 bits on the set to form the φ2 set, where m is an integer. The stream
w can be segmented into pieces wi of length at least log2m, and interpreted as
select for wi = 0, not select for 0 < wi < m and ignore for wi ≥ m.
The point of this construction is fourfold:
– An attacker, whom we assume does not know s (or hence s′), will not be
able to compute φ2, hence he does not know which photons Anne and Bob
will use for their comparison.
– We have implicit authentication: an attacker cannot masquerade convinc-
ingly as either Anne or Bob. Even if he tries a MITM attack and say, mea-
sures all the photons emitted by Anne, he will not be able to provide Anne
(or Bob) with a string of bits matching her (or his) bits without knowledge
of φ2.
– The process of key establishment and authentication are inextricably inter-
twined in the protocol.
– In contrast to the standard protocols, we leak only partial information about
the bits in the φ2 set. Consequently we have the possibility of using these in
the ﬁnal session key, as long as we use suitable privacy ampliﬁcation. Thus
the resulting bit rate will be higher than with previous QKD protocols. It is
worth noting also that an attacker knows less about the bits of the φ3 string:
even if he has managed to surreptitiously measure some of the photons in
this set, he will not know exactly where these sit in the ﬁnal key string.
3.1 Discussion
As mentioned previously: the new approach leaks much less information to the
attacker (about the φ2 and hence the φ3 set) and provides early implicit au-
thentication. In fact, with our modiﬁcation, we do not even have to explicitly
authenticate the classical exchanges between Anne and Bob, hence we do not
need to consume so much of the s string (for example via universal hash func-
tions) in order to ensure integrity.
From the attacker’s perspective, the protocol is unchanged aside from the fact
that he does not now learn the φ2 set. The security of this variant of BB’84 is
thus reducible to that of the original BB’84.
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The new approach also provides a counter to the Photon Number Splitting
(PNS) attack [GBS00]: this can occur when photon pulses have more than one
correlated photon and, in principle, the attacker could measure one (or more)
of the photons in the pulse while leaving one untouched. This provides a way
to eavesdrop on the quantum channel without triggering the detection mech-
anisms (the photon that Bob measures has not been interfered with by the
attacker). Such attacks are worrying, as in practice it is very diﬃcult to elim-
inate completely the occurrence of multiple photon pulses, and they break the
abstractions on which previous correctness proof models were based. This has
prompted proposed counter-measures, such as the SARG protocol [SARG04].
The SARG protocol is however signiﬁcantly more complex that the one pro-
posed here, in particular it involves Anne and Bob having to throw away 75% of
the photons at the ﬁrst step as opposed to 50% in the original BB’84. With the
enhancement proposed here, even an adversary who succeeds in measuring some
photons undetectably in this fashion cannot masquerade successfully during the
eavesdropping/authentication step. Furthermore, even if he manages to extract
some bits of the key stream in this fashion, Yves will not know exactly where
they lie in the ﬁnal key stream.
Another important point is that, from experience in the analysis of classical
AKEs, we know that it is essential that the key establishment and authentication
be explicitly bound together. The approach proposed here achieves this: the bits
that they compare, and hence the bits retained to form the key ultimately, are
derived from the pre-shared secret authentication string s, because the indices
that are identiﬁed for the comparison step, the φ2 set, are computed as a function
of s.
In the event that bits from the φ2 set are used in the ﬁnal key, an issue to
consider is the possibility of belated leakage of information about the s string.
This is analogous to a “forward secrecy” property for a purely classical scheme.
To avoid this threat Anne and Bob should ensure that the utilized parts of s are
deleted as soon as they have served their purpose.
4 The Second Enhancement
Now we introduce the second innovation: rather than generating the basis se-
quence purely randomly, we propose that Anne and Bob also compute the basis
sequence bi as a pseudo-random function of the shared s string. Anne now gener-
ates a true random bit sequence zi and prepares the ith photon according to the
coding convention mentioned earlier. Bob, for his part, measures the i-th photon
using the bi basis. Thus, in the absence of noise or eavesdropping, Bob should
recover the zi sequence exactly as generated by Anne. They now perform a com-
parison of a randomly selected set of elements of the z sequence as before. They
could of course combine this second enhancement with the ﬁrst enhancement,
and secretly compute the comparison subset pseudorandomly.
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4.1 Discussion
An important, and rather surprising, observation that emerges from the analysis
is that, in the absence of an PNS attack, any measurement that the attacker may
perform on the photons during the quantum phase leaks no information about
the basis sequence. A simple calculation using the “operation semantics” of the
measurement operator shows that Yves will get a 0 with probability 12 and a 1
with probability 12 , regardless of which generation basis was used by Anne, and
which measurement basis Yves uses, including oblique ones. This calculation is
based on the assumption that the z sequence and the basis choice have the same
statistics as pure random.
The signiﬁcance of this observation is that it thwarts the obvious strategy
that Yves might attempt: measure lots of photons early in the quantum phase
and try to improve his guesses at the bases further downstream. We also need to
ensure that Yves cannot beneﬁt from a better-than-average guess at the string
s. As argued before, the use of a good block cipher such as AES in counter mode
to provide the PRNG should ensure an adequate lack of correlation.
Suppose that we use a 128 bit string as the seed to generate the basis sequence.
The property we require of the PRNG is that if the attacker gets even one bit
wrong in his guess at the seed, then the xor of the resulting guessed sequence
and the real basis sequence will be essentially random. Using a good block cypher
such as AES in counter mode has exactly this property, by construction. Hence,
unless the attacker gets really lucky and guesses the 128 bits exactly right, he
faces the same challenge as the conventional protocol with a strictly random
basis sequence. This, along with the observation that (in the absence of PNS style
attacks) no observation he can make on the quantum channel can extract any
information about the basis sequence, implies that the security of the enhanced
scheme is essentially the same as that of BB’84.
The above argument is based on the assumption that the attacker has at
most negligible information about the authentication string. This assumption is
standard for BB’84 and QKD protocols in general. We need to take additional
care though with such an assumption for our second enhancement: having non-
zero information about the authentication key for one run may help the attacker
launch a more eﬀective attack in a subsequent run. In conventional BB’84, as
the basis sequences are pure random, this is not an issue. In our case, there is
the possibility that a lucky guess in one run might be ampliﬁed in subsequent
runs. However, as long as the PRNG has the properties stated above, a better
than average guess at the authentication string will not yield any advantage over
a simple bitwise guessing at the basis sequence, and hence confers no advantage
for a subsequent run of the protocol.
However the second enhancement is vulnerable to PNS attacks: for example, if
Yves measures two photons (out of three) in the same basis and they are diﬀerent,
then he knows that the basis choice is wrong. With his inﬁnite computational
power, he can then eliminate approximately half of the potential values for s′
for each such measurement.
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On the other hand, vulnerability to PNS is an unsatisfactory feature of most
QKD protocols - for example SARG itself is insecure if Yves can block all pulses
with fewer than three photons (and half of the three-photon pulses) [SARG04].
One possible response is to stipulate that if Yves is to be equipped with a
reliable photon counter then it is only fair for Anne to have one too. In this case
Anne can eliminate PNS attacks simply by deleting pulses with more than one
photon, and under this assumption protocols incorporating the second enhance-
ment are invulnerable.
Of course, informal arguments such as the ones given above need to be made
formal in the context of an appropriate model that encompasses both the quan-
tum and classical aspects.
5 The Third Enhancement
The most radical of our proposals involves Anne and Bob eﬀectively testing all
of the bits in φ1, and not merely a subset. To do this we use a trick from the
Vintage Bit protocol of Christianson and Shafarenko [CS09]. The protocol se-
quence proceeds as usual (Section 2) until the end of Phase 2. At this point Anne
has a bitstream z corresponding to the elements of φ1 and Bob has a bitstream
z′ which is the same as z apart from the QER (including any eavesdropping.)
Instead of Phases 3 and 4, Anne and Bob proceed as follows:
Anne and Bob have set aside a segment p of a previously agreed key stream.
This is now used as One-Time Pad to conceal a Forward Error Correcting Code
F and a collision-resistant hash h of the key stream z currently being agreed.
Speciﬁcally:
A → B : [F (z) | h(z)] xor p
Bob now recovers F (z), applies this to z′, and checks that the result hashes
to h(z). If not, then Bob aborts the protocol, otherwise Anne and Bob proceed
with Phase 5 as usual.
5.1 Discussion
Note that the property of the hash h being relied upon here is not non-invertibility
(since Yves can never learn any bits of the hash value) but a particular form of col-
lision resistance:Yves cannotmanipulate the values for z or h(z) plausiblywithout
knowing p. Note also that no authentication or integrity is required for the open
channel communication betweenAnne andBob used to transmit the encodedF (z)
in this enhancement. Privacy ampliﬁcation can be done deterministically by Anne
and Bob, with no further communication. Of course, the hash could be replaced by
the conventional use of an information-theoretically secure MAC at the end of the
protocol; but equally, Step 6 could be replaced by an authenticated conﬁrmation
to Alice by Bob that the corrected value of z′ has the correct hash1.
1 For example, B → A : p′ where p′ is another segment of a previously agreed key
stream.
Enhancements to QKD Protocols 133
The requirement to use key bits from a previous run for p appears to be
an additional burden, but this step replaces Phases 3 and 4 of the conventional
protocol. Although the number of bits required for F (z), and hence for p, is of the
order of twice the maximum allowable QER for z, under the third enhancement
no bits are lost from z by the need to reveal bits to detect eavesdropping, or to
apply a cascade protocol.
The approach with the third enhancement has the advantage that any suitably
aggressive FEC protocol can be used oﬀ the shelf, without concern for security
issues, and Bob can count exactly how many of the bits in z needed to be
corrected.
The third enhancement can be combined with the second enhancement, with
similar caveats about PNS.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed some simple but eﬀective enhancements to the BB’84 based
QKD protocols. These enhancements explicitly ensure a closer binding between
key-establishment and authentication than for previous protocols. They ensure
very early detection of any MITM or masquerade attacks as well as the possibility
of higher bit rates and an eﬀective counter to PNS style attacks.
We have also argued that we need more powerful models, that encompass
both the quantum and classical aspects of QKD protocols, in order to deal with
richer threat models.
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